DOCTRINE OF PRECATORY TRUSTS.
:, 4 of the"Statute of Frauds, as
icted in Pennsylvania, was conaed, and it was held that the
isideration of a written agree.nt to answer for the debt of
ther need not be expressed in
e writing but might be proved
other evidence.
The doctrine of Wain v. Warlrs has been adopted in Colorado,
alaware, Georgia, Kansas, Maryad, Minnesota, Montana, New
ampshire, New York and Wis-

consin. On the other hand, it is
provided by statute in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Jersey and Virginia that the
consideration need not be stated.
And that it need not be set forth is
also law in Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio,
Tennessee and Vermont.
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Precatory Words.

A will containing the provisions "I give and bequeath to my 16ving
-wife Roda all my property real and personal for her support during her
natural lifetime ;. any remainder at her decease to be disposed of by her
as she may think just and right among my children," gives the widow a
fee, with all its incidents, including the power to sell and the power to
devise. The words referring to "any remainder" are precatory and do
not limit the. estate. Words of trust and confidence, without more, do
not create a trust or turn a devisee into a trustee. The intentions of the
testator to create a trust must be apparent apart from the mere existence
of words of trust and confidence, or none will be held to exist.
DOCTRINE op PRZCATORY TRusTs.
The doctrine of precatory trusts commissum: Jus. Inst.'2, 24, 3:
Pennocks' Estate, 20 Pa., 268. The
has been traced to the Roman law,
earfier rule of English chancery
where such words as peto, rogo,
was that when by will property was
volo, mando, fidei tuae, committo,
were generally used in the fidei- giyen absolutely to a person who
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was by the giver "recommended,"
"entreated,"
"requested"
or
"wished"
to dispose of that
property in favor of another, the
recommendation or. request was
-held to be imperative and to
create a trust, if the subject and
objects were certain: Powell on
Devises, 351 ; 2 Redfield on Wills,
419 Hill on Trustees, ii3.
It was formerly said that a prima
* fade presumption of an intention
to create a trust arose from the use
of precatory words; or, as put by
* Lord A&vAvry, "Whenever any
.persqn gives property and points
out the object, the property and
the way it shall go, that does
* create a trust, unless he shows
learly that his desire expressed is
to be controlled by the party, and
that he shall have an option to
defeat it:" Malim v. Keighley, 2
Ves. Jr., 333; Paul v. Comptom, 8
Ves., 375 ; Ford v. Fowler, 3 Beav.,
146; Prevost v. Clark, 2 Mad., 458;
Massey v. Sherman, Amb., 520;
Harding v. Glynn, 2 L. Ca. Eq.,
948 and note; Theobald on Wills,
355., At the same time there has
- alwdys existed a steady opposition
to the doctrine, on the part of
eminent jurists: Sale v. Moore, i
Sim., 534; Meredith v. Heneage,
id., 542; Lawless v. Shaw, i LI. &
C., 154; 5 Cl. & F., 129. The
criticisms of the text writers being
particularly severe for the reason
that to put such an artificial construction upon the words of a will
* is to defeat the intention of the
testator in nearly every instance.
It can scarcely be presumed,"
writes Justice STORY, "that every
testator should not clearly under.stand the difference between such
expressions and words of positive
direction and command, and that
in using one and omitting the

other he should not have a determinate end in view:" 2 Story's
Equity Jurisp., 1069; 2 Redfield
on Wills, 423; 2 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisp., 1017.
Courts of equity have, for many
-years shown a strong tendency to
restrict the operation of the rile
within narrow bounds, so that the
doctrine of the early cases is now
practically obsolete. The change
has been effected through two
canons of cotistruction: first, that
the intention of the testator must
be ascertained by a consideration
of the whole instrument; second,
that when, a devise or bequest is
explicitly conveyed in a will it
cannot be defeated or abridged by
subsequent words which are ambiguous: Reid v. Atkinson, Ir.
Rep., 5 Eq., 373; Sudgen on Property, 276. In Iambe v. Eames,
JAMis, L. J., said: "In hearing
case after case cited I could not
help feeling that the officious kindness of the Court of Chancery in
interposing trusts where, in many
cases the father of the family never
meant to create trusts, must have
been a very cruel kindness indeed:"
L. R., 6 Ch. App., 596. This declaration marks the change in the
current of decisions in England
with regard to precatory trusts:
Stead v. Mellor, s Ch. Div., 225;
In re Hutchinson and Tenant, 8
Ch. Div., 540. In the leading English case, It re Adams and the
Kensington Vestry, a testator gave
all his property to the absolute use
of his wife and her heirs "in full
confidence that she would do what
was right as to the disposal thereof
between his children either in her
lifetime or by will." The widow
took an absolute interest, COTTON,
L. J., saying, "We must not extend
the old cases in any way or rely
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upon the mere use of particular
words, but, considering all the
words which are used, we have to
see what is their true effect and
what was the intention of the testator as expressed in his will :" 27
Ch. Div., 394; Mussoorie Bank v.
Raynor, 7 App. Ca., 327; In re
Diggles, 39 Ch. Div., 253. The
court will not allow a precatory
trust to be raised unless, on the
consideration of all the words employed, it comes to the conclusion
that it is the intention of the testator to preate a trust: Bretts'
Modern L. Ca., Eq., X3.
The rule requiring a definite subject matter and a definite object
applies as well to precatory as to
other express trusts: Knight v.
Knight, 3 Beav, 148; Williams v.
Williams, i Sine., N. S., 358. The
rule is not often applied, however,
to the extent of letting in the heir
or next of kin: Jarman on Wills,
366. Uncertainty in the object, it
is thought, furnishes a strong argument that the testator had no intention to raise a trust: Bernard v.
Minshull, Johns, 276; Parnall v.
Parnall, 9 lCh. Div., 96; Howard v.
Carusi, 109 U. S., 725; cf. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 62 L. T. Rep., 735.
On the other'hand, if it plainly
appears that the testator believed
he was raising a trust by the use of'
words of recommendation or request, his iitention must *prevail,
and on failure for uncertainty the
heir or next of kin will be let in.
Once establish that a trust was intended and the legatee can not
take beneficially: Briggs v. Penny,
-3 McN. & G., 546; In re Foley's
Will, io N. Y. S., I2; citing Willets v. Willets, 1o3 N. Y., 650;
Ingram v. Fraley, 29 Ga., 553. Just
as uncertainty of the property and
object are reasons for not constru-

ing the will as erecting a trust, so,
also, thefactthata trustwould cause
embarassment and difficulty, is a
reason for coming to the same conclusion: BowEN, L. J., in In re
Diggles, sutra. "It is not an unwholesome rule that if a testator
really mean his recommendation
to be imperative he should express
his intention in a mandatory
form:" Sugden on Property, 276.
In the United States there was at
first a manifest disposition to apply
the earlier English rule: Bull v.
Bull, 8 Conn., 47, Coates, Appeal, 2
Pa., 129; Cole v. Littlefield, 35 Me.,
439; Harrison v. Harrison, 2 Gratt.;
Lucas v. Lockhart, io Sm. and
Marsh., 466; Dresser v. Dresser, 46
Me., 58; Erickson v. Willard, i N.
H., 217; Hunter v. Stemridge, 12
Geo., 192.
In Florida, Alabama and South
Carolina the courts from the first
were inclined to. receive the rule with great caution, influenced by
the views of Judge SToRY and the
change which they perceived was
taking place in England : Lines v.
Darden, 5Fla., 51;.Lesesne v. Witte, ,
5 S. C., 450. "We refuse," said'the Court in Alabama, "to follow
a rule of construction which many
acknowledge to have been founded
in error, and from which they
would gladly recede if they could:"
Ellis v. Ellis, i5 Ala., 296, c.f. McRee's Exrs. v. Means, 34 Ala., 349.
The Court in Connecticut, it may be
added, took an early opportunity
of reconsidering their former dicta
and adopted a more restricted rule:
Gilbert v. Chapin, i9 Conn, 351;
Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn., 257.
In the main the courts have kept
pace with the change of view in
England, and the doctrines adopted
in the two countries are substantially the same.
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In Pennsylvania the doctrine of
took an estate for life. 137 Pa.,
precatory trusts has not met with 448. Where the words of recomfavor.
Coates' Appeal (supra), mendation or request are used in
direct reference to the estate they
which upheld such trusts, was
formally reversed, the Court de- are frima fade testamentary and
claring that "the old Roman
imperative, and not precatory:
hud English rfile on this subject 'Board of Missions v. Culp, 151 Pa.,
* was not part of the Common
467; ee Wood v. Camden Trust Co.,
44 . J. Eq., 419.
Law of Pennsylvania:" Pennock's
In addition to Pennsylvania, the
A review
Ebtate, 20 Pa., 268.
latest decision in a number of
6f the principal cases that have
sustained and extended the ruliig
States show a tendency to restrict
the operation of the doctrine within
in Pennock's Estate will be found
in the opinion of WILIAMS, J.,
narrow limits. In California a tesin Boyle v. Boyle, the case an- tator devised real property "recomnotated: Burt v. Herron, 66 Pa., mending" the devisee to leave his
portion, after his death, to his
400; Janretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa.;
466; Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa,
children, and if none survived then
to Harvard College. The gift, it
219; all leading to the conclusion
that the. intention of the testator was decided, was absolute to the
devisee. If the testator had inmust be apparent apar from the
tended to create a trust he would
'mere existence of words of confihave said so in plain language,
"dende or no trust will be held to
exist. In Bolby v. Thunder, testa- such as he used in other clauses of
the same will. In re Whitcomb,
" tor devised all his property to his
86 Cal., 265. South Carolina has
wife "in the fullest confidence . . .
fortified the ruling in Lesesne v.
that she will carry my intentions,
Witte, suntra, by decisions that lay
as to the ultimate distribution, into
down the principle that "precatory
effect." It was held that having
made an unqualified devise of his trusts or recommeiidatory words
property, no precatory words ad- imply discretion, and must be so
dressed to the devisee could defeat
construed unless a different sense
is irresistibly forced upon them by
the estate previously devised: io 5
the context:" Rowland v. RowPa., 173; ,Hopkins v. Glunt, iii
Pa., 287. In Good v. Fichthorn, land, 29 S. C., 54; Howze v. Barber,
where the words were "I do hereby 29 S. C., 466.
The Court of Chancery of Delaenjoin and direct," it was said that
words of command were as ineffect- ware, in construing the following
clause: "I do request my wife, if
'ual as precatory words to reduce an
she should not require the whole
estate in fee to an estate for life.
-,In Oyster v. Knull, however, where
of my estate as a support, that she
will will at her death the remainder
testator devised a farm in the folto the children of my brother C."
lowing words: "To my son N. for
his support and if he shquld be held, that no trust arose in favor of
the children; the Chancellor noting
spared to have a family I desire the
above estate to go to the use'of his the fact that this was the first time
children," it was held that the that the question had been raised
in Delaware: Bryan v. Milby, 24
word "desire" was not precatory
AtI. Rep., 333. A similar result
but mandatory, and that thae son
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was attained in Nevada: Hunt V.
Hunt, ii Nev., 442; and Iowa: Bulfer v. Willingrod, 7r Ia., 620; Bills
v. Bills, So Iowa (where the words
might have been regarded as testamentary since they referred directly to the property).
In Indiana, the reluctance of
.English chancellors to follow the
early decisions has been discussed
and the doctrine that an absolute
gift is not to be limited by subsequent precatory words considered
and approved: Fullenweider v.
Watson, IT3 Ind., 18; Van Gorden
v. Smith, 99 Ind., 4o4; cf.Elliott v.
Elliott, 117 Ind., 38o. So too in
Missouri the Court, referring to Ix
re Adams, siepra, has refused to
carry out the declared wishes of
the testator unless he has manifested a clear intention to create a
trust: Corby v. Corby, 85 Mo., 371.
But the surrounding circumstances
of the parties must be taken into
consideration together with the
language of the will: Noe v. Kern,
93 Mo., 367 (a case where unusual
hardship would have resulted from
a failure on the part of the court to
raise a trust).
In Illinois the courts have shown
an inclination to favor precatory
words, raising a trust from the following clause in a will: "Reposing
implicit confidence in the goodness
and kindness of my dear wife, I
rely upon her to make all needful
provisions
for my brother."
Blanchard v. Chapman, 22 11. App.,
34r. But in Giles v. Anslow, where
the words were "I have full confidence in my beloved-wife M., that
she will do what is best and proper
with my effects," and. declaring
that she was to be free from all restraint, it was held that the widow
took a fee. "If the intention of
the testator be doubtful precatory

words will not be construed into a
declaration of trust:" i28 Ill., 187 ;
Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill., 123;
Jones v. Jones, X24 Ill. 254. In
Randall v. Randall, 135 Ill., 398, it
was said that no trust can be implied from words that merely indicate the motive which induced the,
gift, and this is particularly the
case when the donee is the parent:
Seamonds v. Hodge, i5 S. E. Rep.
(W. Va.), 156. Where testator gave
all his property to his wife P for the
purpose of raising her children,"
it was held that no precatory trust
was created or implied thereby for
the children: Wilmoth v. Wilmoth,
34 W. Va., 426; Rhett v. Mason, i8
Gratt 541, cf. Young v. Young, 68
N. C., 309.
Ip Kentucky, a testator devised
and bequeathed property to his
brother, requesting him to settle
$io,ooo upon L., and added:" These
requests are not to be legally binding, but I desire to leave the same
to his discretion,-and to make no
requirement of him that would be
legally binding upon him in a court
of equity or elsewhere." The Cpurt,
nevertheless, taking all the facts
into consideration, decided that a
trust was created in favor of L.:
B'ohon v. Barrett, 79 Ky, 378.
Later decisions have distinguished
this case: Sale v. Thornberry, 86
Ky., 266; Enders v. Tasco, 89 Ky.,
1 7. A decision that may produce a
reaction in favor of precatory trusts
is that in Colton v. Colton; by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The testator, after a gift of all his
estate to his wife, continued: "I
recommend to her the care and protection of my mother Vnd sister,
and request her to make such gift
and provision for them as in her
judgment will be best." It was
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suggested that the subject matter
of the trust was so indefinite-as to
raise the inference that no trust
was intended. The Court, however,
decided that the subject matter was
sufficiently definite, and, as the
widow had declined to exercise her
discretion, it *ould be the duty of
" the court to determine what provision would be suitable, under the
circumstances: 127 U. S., 300. In
the opinion two Massachusetts decisions are quoted with approval.
In Warner v. Bates, the most important of these, testatrix gave the
income from her estate to her husband, "in full confidence" that
he would .give her children such
protection and support as they
might need. The Court, in hold"
ing that the words raised a trust,
pointed out the merits of the doctrine of precatory trusts, and vig6rously defended the rule, but held
that the recommendatory clause
" must be so expressed as to warrant
the inference that it was designed
to be peremptory on the donee: 98
Mass. 274.
- In
Hess v. Singler, 114 Mass.,
56, the testator, after a gift to his
son, signified his desire. and hope
that he would, by will or otherwise,
provide for certain relatives. The
* creation of a trust, the Court
thought, would have been inconsistent with the purposes of the testator.' In none of the Massachusetts cases has the court shown any
inclination to force the doctrine,
making it a matter of fair construction: Sears v. Cunningham, 122
Mass., 538; Barrett v. Marsh, 126
Mass., 213; Bacon v. Ransom, 139
Mass., 1i 7 ; Fiske v. Joy, 141 Mass.,
3p9. The words, "My said wife is
fully acquainted with my reasons
for this disposal of my estate, and
will, by her own last testament, do

-

whatis right and just to my children
and their natural heirs," did not
create a trust, but stated the motive
of the testator in not doing so:
Sturgis v. Paine, 146 Mass., 354.
Van Duyne v. Van Duyue, 14
-N. J. Eq., was the first important
discussion of the question in the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
The Chancellor. criticised adversely
the doctrine of precatory trusts, and
declined to raise a trust under the
will in question. His decision,
however, was, on appeal, reversed
by the Court of Errors and Appeals(15 N. J. Eq., 5o3), and,. although
no opinion was filed, the reversal
has always been regarded by the
bar and bench as an expression of
preference on the part of the court
for the older English law: Cpx v.
Wills, 49 N.J. Eq., 130, 573. In
Eddy v. Hartshorne, a legacy " to
A., with the request that upon his
death he leave the same to B. and
C.," was held to raise a trust in
favor of B. and C., not defeated by
the death of A. in testator's lifetime: 34 N. J. Eq., 49.
Where a testator gave property
to his wife "to dispose of as she
will elect," and added, "I would
however recomand her to increase.
the donation to B1." so as to make
her share equal to that left to C., a
trust was created in favor of B.
The Ordinary, although convinced
that the current of the later cases
in this country and in England is
against the adoption of this rule,
nevertheless felt bound to regard
it as binding upon him : Eberhart
v. Perolin, 48 N. J. Eq., 592.
The New York reports contain a
number of interesting discussions
of this question. In Foose v. Whitmore a disposition was shown to
restrict the rule in conformity with
Lambe v. Eames (supra), 83 N. Y.,
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So, also, in Lawrence v.
Cooke, where, after a gift to the
wife, testator added: "I enjoin
upon her to make such provision
for said B out of my estate in such
manner, at such times and in such
amounts as she may judge to be
conducive to the welfare of B," the
Court decided that it was beyond
the power of any court to substitute
its discretion for that of the legatee,
and no trust was created. On the
other hand, in Phillips v. Phillips,
112 N. Y., 197, where the will, after
a gift to the wife, provided: "If
she find it always convenient to
give my brother the interest on
$ro,oco, I wish it to be done," a
charge was imposed in favor of the
brother. The provision contemplated, not the wife's discretion,
but her pecuniary condition each
year: Riker v. Leo, 115 N. Y., 93;
Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y,, 427.
The one important and vital inquiry-is, whether the alleged bequest is so definite as to amount
and subject matter as to be capable of execution by the court, or
whether it so depends upon the discretion of the general devisee as to
be incapable of execution without
superceding that discretion: Phillips v. Phillips (sup ra).
The case of In re Ingersoll is
important, from its relation, to the
law imposing restrictions on charitable bequests. Testatrix, after a
gift, "relied" upon the legatee to
carry out certain charitable purposes set forth in the will. The
Court held that the legatee took
the sum individually and absolutely
to be used in his discretion for the
general objects mentioned: 59Hun.,
571; compare Zn re Foley's Will, 1o
N. Y. S., 12. More important still
is In re Keleman's Will. Testatrix,
by her will, gave legacies to four

charitable institutions.

Four days

later she added a codicil, as follows: "Doubts having arisen as to
the validity of the bequests made
for charitable purposes in my will,
I hereby modify my will by making
W my residuary legatee, and hereby request him to carry into effect
my wishes with respect thereto, but
this is not to be construed into an
absolute direction on my part, but
merely my desire." This codicil
was added to prevent the failure of
the legacies, should testatrix die (as
in fact happened)within two months
of the execution of the will. The.
Court held the bequest to W abso-,
lute, and, therefore, on the face of
the will, valid.
In Wisconsin, the Court, while
disinclined to go to the length of
the older cases in establishing trusts
upon the strength of precatory
words, is not disposed to repudiate
the whole doctrine of such trusts:,
Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis., 172; and a
similar view prevails in Texas: McMurry v. Stanley, 69 Tex.,*227; see
also, Low v. Low, 77 Me., 171 ; and'
Cockerill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark.,
58o. In Ohio it was said in a re-.
cent case that while the decisions
may have been influenced by the
sympathy of individual chancellors
they generally agree that the intentions of the testator, gathered from
the will in all -its terms, will be
given efect whether the terms be
dispositive, peremptory, or precatory only: Ide v. Clirk, 5 Ohio C.
C., 239.
By way of summary it may be
said that the courts of this country,
as well as of England, exhibit the
same general tendency to limit,
rather than extend, the doctrine of
precatory trusts, and to construe
words of recommendation or desire
according to their natural and ordi-

